Abstract-The core vision of the smart grid concept is the realization of reliable two-way communications between smart devices (e.g., IEDs, PLCs, PMUs). The benefits of the smart grid also come with tremendous security risks and new challenges in protecting the smart grid systems from cyber threats. Particularly, the use of untrusted counterfeit smart grid devices represents a real problem. Consequences of propagating false or malicious data, as well as stealing valuable user or smart grid state information from counterfeit devices are costly. Hence, early detection of counterfeit devices is critical for protecting smart grid's components and users. To address these concerns, in this poster, we introduce our initial design of a configurable framework that utilize system call tracing, library interposition, and statistical techniques for monitoring and detection of counterfeit smart grid devices. In our framework, we consider realistic counterfeit device scenarios with different smart grid devices and adversarial settings. Our initial results on a realistic testbed utilizing actual smart-grid GOOSE messages with IEC-61850 communication protocol are very promising. Our framework is showing excellent rates on detection of smart grid counterfeit devices from impostors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The success of the smart grid depends on the integration of electrical distribution systems with communication networks. Because of the critical importance of the smart grid communication devices, the use of untrusted counterfeit devices could negatively impact the smart grid performance. Counterfeit devices can also bring catastrophic consequences for the integrity of the power grid and/or user's privacy. Indeed, counterfeiting accounts for at least $7.5B in lost revenue for U.S. semiconductor companies [1] . This ongoing work focuses on how to monitor and detect counterfeit devices once they manage to break the security breaches in the supply chain and become part of the smart grid architecture. To the best of our knowledge, there is neither a reliable nor a secure mechanism that enables the detection of counterfeit devices which are being used in the smart grid. Hence, in this paper, we propose a configurable framework that is capable of detecting counterfeit devices which are performing unauthorized operations inside critical parts of the smart grid architecture. Specifically, the proposed framework utilizes system call tracing, library interposition, and statistical techniques to monitor and detect counterfeit devices' behaviour. In order to test our framework, we implement a realistic smart grid scenario which performs essential operations under International Electrotechnical Commision 61850 (IEC61850) protocol [2] . The proposed testbed includes resource-limited (e.g., Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)) and resource-rich (e.g., Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)) devices that follow a GOOSE publishersubscriber configuration using open source libiec61850 libraries [3] . In our adversary model, we consider different counterfeit device scenarios. Specifically, we define three different threats for two different smart-grid devices, resourcerich and resource-limited devices. Our adversary model is also aligned with the security requirements defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the smart grid. Our initial experimental evaluation shows that our proposed framework can successfully detect smart grid's counterfeit devices.
II. ADVERSARY MODEL
Our adversary model considers, conforming to the NIST standard, different counterfeit-device scenarios using realistic smart grid protocols. The scenarios combine three possible counterfeit-device-based threats affecting two devices with different resources, resource-rich (e.g., PMUs, IEDs) and resource-limited (e.g., RTUs, PLCs) [4] . The three possible threats can be defined as follow: (1) the smart grid counterfeit devices create additional instances of publisher and subscriber objects and start leaking sensitive information; (2) the smart grid counterfeit devices allocate small and unauthorized amounts of memory to store fake data and exhaust computing resources; and (3) the counterfeit devices create unauthorized hidden files to store critical information which is sent later. With the last two adversary, we consider counterfeit devices that utilize memory maliciously. We also assume that a counterfeit device tries to reuse as many functions and threads from the genuine systems as it can. Also, it performs its attacks following a Poisson distribution. The Poisson distribution allows for randomly and efficiently spacing the attacks and constitutes a valid model to capture the randomness of such events [5] .
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
For implementing our testbed, we utilize an open source version of IEC-61850 [3] . As noted earlier, we include in our model two different types of devices: resource-rich and resource-limited devices. The resource-limited device (GOOSE publisher) runs on a Raspberry Pi 2B, using Advance RISC Machine (ARM) 32 bits architecture with limited memory and CPU resources. The resource-rich device (GOOSE subscriber) runs on a Linux Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine with a more powerful CPU and higher memory. Our framework utilizes system call tracing (ptrace) and library interposition techniques to get valuable information about the type and amount of system calls raised while the devices are communicating. We propose the use of two different detection techniques: (1) system call lists comparison between genuine and counterfeit devices to identify extra system call activity; (2) statistical correlation between genuine and counterfeit devices' system call lists to identify differences in the order that the system calls are invoked; and (3) a novel chunk-based correlation which allows for removing randomness in system call lists and improves the statistical results obtained by applying correlation only. In general, the framework is designed so every detection technique applied will overcome the possible limitations of the previous ones. For comparison purposes, our framework assumes there is a real device D 0 it can trust, acquired in a healthy way from the supply chain.
IV. INITIAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the initial performance of the proposed framework. Firstly, we compare the type and amount of the different system calls between genuine and counterfeit smart grid devices. Secondly, we apply correlation in order to detect statistical relations between genuine and counterfeit system call lists. Table I summarizes the results obtained after applying the first detection technique of our framework on the resource-rich. The second column lists the most relevant system calls detected while columns from 3 to 6 compare the average of normalized rate of system calls for genuine (Gen.) and counterfeit devices (columns from 4 to 6) for all defined threats. Any value greater than 1 for columns from 4 to 6 potentially represents extra system call activity due the presence of malicious code. It can be noticed that, for the case where ptrace is used, our framework is able to identify the counterfeit devices for all the analyzed scenarios. In the case of library interposition, only malicious code 1 (Mal. 1) was detected. Similar outcome were obtained for the case of limited-resource devices. To further improve the previous results we apply our second detection technique. Figure 1 shows the outcomes after applying correlation. By setting correlation threshold at 0.6 (moderate to strong correlation), the framework is able, on average, to detect the majority of counterfeit devices. Only in the case of library interposition applied to resourcelimited devices the current version of the framework cannot be applied. The high level of randomness found in the resourcelimited genuine device's system call lists causes low levels of correlation (under 0.6). These type of outcome limits the use of resource-limited genuine device's data as reliable reference for resource-limited counterfeit device detection when library interposition is used. To overcome this limitation and as part of future work, we will focus on the implementation of a novel correlation technique that allows for removing randomness from system call lists. The implementation of a third detection technique will allow for using our framework on a wider range of smart grid devices while increasing its reliability and success rate. 
